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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have proven their worth on the 
battlefields of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon.1  UAVs offer a relatively 
low-cost, low-risk alternative to manned aircraft in the military setting.2  
The same advantages have led many to see natural applications for UAVs 
in a domestic setting.3 
Technological advances in communications, control, and optics in 
recent decades will no doubt increase pressure to introduce UAV systems 
for a host of domestic applications.4  In the coming years, law enforcement 
agencies will seek to use UAVs5 to police borders, control crowds, track 
 
1. P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR:  THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 37 (2009).  According to P.W. Singer, a “veritable menagerie of unmanned drones 
now circles above the soldier in Iraq, reporting back to all sorts of units.” Id.  Although the U.S. 
military’s operation of Predator and Reaper drones in Afghanistan and Iraq has been well 
publicized, Israel has also used UAVs extensively, including its 2006 conflict with Hezbollah in 
Lebanon.  See Larry Dickerson, New Respect for UAVs, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 
26, 2009, at 94 (noting Israel deployed the largest number of UAVs during the 2006 conflict).  
UAVs also saw action in the 2008 conflict between Russian and Georgia in the South Ossetia 
region. Id. 
2. Mark Edward Peterson, The UAV and the Current and Future Regulatory Construct for 
Integration into the National Airspace System, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 521, 523 (2006). 
3. See Ron Chambers, Policing’s New Eye in the Sky: The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
in Law Enforcement, J. OF CAL. L. ENFORCEMENT, Jan. 1, 2006, at 7 (“UAVs provide a cost-
effective solution to safe and speedy response to crime scenes without endangering the lives of the 
innocent who might otherwise be in the path of a hurried officer or deputy trying to catch up with 
the demand for their services.”). 
4. To date, a number of civilian law enforcement agencies have begun to explore the 
domestic use of UAVs.  See, e.g., Sacramento Police Exploring Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Technology, US STATE NEWS, Dec. 5, 2007, available at 2007 WL 25932296; An idea that may 
not fly, KAN. CITY STAR, Feb. 6, 2008, at B8 (noting that a Topeka politician proposed purchasing 
UAVs in lieu of police helicopter); Ben Reed, Jr., Future Technology in Law Enforcement, FBI L. 
ENFORCEMENT BULL., May 1, 2008, at 16-17 (“At least one large U.S. metropolitan police 
agency is experimenting with UAVs . . . .”). 
5. UAV optical feeds could replace video feeds from helicopters for law enforcement 
agencies.  Rob Margetta, Protecting Planes, Spotting Liars and Diverting Hurricanes:  A Peek at 
S&T’s Research, CQ HOMELAND SECURITY, June 4, 2008, available at 2008 WL 10887939. 
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criminals, detect illegal narcotics activities,6 and spot crime.7  Farmers will 
employ UAVs to conduct soil studies, seed fields, and dust crops.8  The 
U.S. Forest Service and local fire departments will use UAVs to track the 
spread of dangerous wildfires.9  Telecommunications companies may use 
UAVs to provide rapid mobile and fixed site communications relays.10  
Mineral and energy companies may use UAVs to survey terrain and check 
pipelines for leaks or damage.11  The revolution is coming.12 
Significant administrative and regulatory hurdles will confront policy-
makers as they seek to integrate UAVs into the domestic airspace system.13  
Those obstacles have been the subject of some scholarship14 and are 
addressed by other contributions to this symposium.  This article explores 
the narrower issue of civil liability arising from the operation of UAVs by 
law enforcement authorities.  Tort law has a well established body of rules 
and doctrines dealing with civil liability surrounding traditional aviation.  
The extent to which such rules can accommodate the coming UAV revolu-
tion is the focus of this article.  This article assumes that the legal hurdles to 
operating UAVs in the national airspace system are surmounted, and then 
 
6. UAVs could be used to aid law enforcement personnel in locating marijuana fields. 
William Matthews, Simply Complex, NATIONAL GUARD, Sept. 1, 2007, at 35. 
7. UAV producers in Israel and South Africa have clearly demonstrated an intention to mar-
ket UAVs for law enforcement applications.  See, e.g., Israel Aerospace Industries, Ltd., Bird Eye 
-Mini UAV, http://www.iai.co.il/32947-33738-en/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) 
(describing the use of Israeli Aerospace Industries UAV for “law-enforcement” squads); Mahesh 
Acharya, UAVs—In Civil Service, http://www.spsairbuz net/story.asp?Article=112 (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2010) (“Seeker, a tactical UAV system, is reportedly already in use in South Africa for the 
purposes of monitoring crowds and carrying out urban surveillance activities.”). 
8. See generally David Hyunchul Shim et al., A Development of Unmanned Helicopters for 
Industrial Applications, 54 J. INTELLIGENCE ROBOT SYSTEMS 407, 409 (2009) (discussing 
agricultural applications for VTOL UAVs). 
9. Jeff Wise, No Pilot, No Problem:  Unmanned Planes—Already Critical to the Military—
Are Poised to Soar in Civilian Skies, POPULAR MECHANICS, Apr. 2007, available at 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/air_space/4213464 html. 
10. Peterson, supra note 2, at 550. 
11. Brad Kelly, Unmanned Aircraft Helps Soldiers See Where the Enemy is Hiding, 
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Aug. 21, 2008, available at 2008 WL 15717120. 
12. The British government’s home office produced a science and innovation strategy paper 
which identified UAVs as the “future” of law enforcement.  Maurice Fitzmaurice, PSNI’s Newest 
Recruit . . . The Robocopter:  Uni Building Pounds 2.2.m “Spy in the Sky”, DAILY MIRROR (UK), 
Mar. 3, 2009, at 17.  According to the report, “UAVs are likely to be an increasingly useful tool 
for police in the future, potentially reducing the number of dangerous situations the police may 
have to enter.  They may also provide evidence for prosecutions and support police operations in 
real time.” Id.  Most aviation experts predict tremendous growth in the use of UAVs for 
nonmilitary applications.  Dave Hirschman, Georgian Teaches Pilots Who Never Leave Ground, 
ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 2, 2006, at F1. 
13. The FAA has formed a program office to develop UAV regulations, but expects the 
process to take several years.  Hirschman, supra note 12, at F1. 
14. See generally Peterson, supra note 2, at 561-65. 
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speculates about potential civil liability concerns should things, as they 
always do, go wrong. 
Part II provides worst-case scenarios in various contexts.  Assuming 
UAVs are integrated into the national airspace system and employed by law 
enforcement authorities, what worst-case results can be imagined that 
would produce potential civil lawsuits?  Part III provides an overview of 
existing aviation liability law and considers the special doctrines of govern-
mental immunity that protect, to a greater or lesser degree, law enforcement 
authorities from civil litigation.  In discussing each applicable legal doc-
trine, part III considers any special considerations likely to arise from the 
introduction of UAVs into the national airspace and the integration of 
UAV-related civil claims into the existing body of aviation tort law.  Part 
IV addresses selected additional legal concerns. 
Aviation law is big business for plaintiffs’ attorneys.  The magnitude of 
damages associated with aviation accidents—including personal injury to 
passengers, loss of aircraft, and ground damage—has made millionaires out 
of more than a few members of the plaintiffs’ bar.15  Inevitably, civil litiga-
tion will follow the coming UAV revolution.  This article seeks to prepare 
law enforcement authorities to handle the budgetary and tactical implica-
tions of altered liability exposure. 
II. WHAT MIGHT GO WRONG? 
UAVs integrated into the national airspace system for law enforcement 
applications would carry several types of risk of injury to persons, property, 
and other protected interests.  It is safe to assume that any domestic UAVs 
would be limited to “unweaponed” surveillance and/or communications 
relay models.  Although some law enforcement applications might be envi-
sioned for weaponized UAVs—a Predator-launched Hellfire missile would 
be a great way to stop a high speed chase—the risks associated with 
domestic deployment of high explosives will likely lead to a more cautious 
approach to UAV integration. 
 
15. Corboy & Demetrio, Aviation Litigation, http://www.corboydementrio.com/assets/ 
pdf/area_4.pdf.  The Chicago plaintiff’s firm of Corboy & Demetrio, for instance, has netted two 
settlements in aviation law cases that each exceeded $25 million. 
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A. GROUND DAMAGE 
Aircraft crash.  UAVs are certainly no exception.16  Operating overseas 
in sparsely populated regions, UAVs have crashed periodically but 
presumably rarely caused civilian casualties or property damage.17  Integra-
ting UAVs into the domestic airspace system, even if such platforms are 
limited to law enforcement use, will eventually lead to ground damage.  
Crafts themselves could crash or component parts could fall from platforms 
causing ground damage. 
To date, UAVs have had a higher mishap rate than traditional manned 
aircraft.18  The Air Force’s RQ-1 Predator had 32 times as many mishaps 
per flight-hour when compared to general, manned aviation, the Navy’s 
RQ-2 Pioneer more than 300 times as many mishaps, and the Army’s RQ-5 
Hunter nearly 60 times as many.19  Advances in technology, training, and 
operation in a peacetime climate will likely reduce these accident rates, but 
UAV safety “needs to improve by one to two orders of magnitude to reach 
the equivalent level of safety of manned aircraft.”20  UAVs, for instance, 
lack the de-icing systems available on manned aircraft, and without a pilot 
capable of observing ice on the craft’s wings, UAVs may be more suscep-
 
16. Matthew Hickley, Spies in the Sky that Could Watch our Every Move, DAILY MAIL 
(UK), May 15, 2007, at 19, available at http://www.dailymail.co.ud/sciencetech/article-454945/ 
spies-sky-watch-move html (“For all their successes, military UAVs are prone to crashes on 
takeoff and landing and many have been lost over battlefields.”). 
17. C.W. Johnson, Insights from the Nogales Predator Crash for the Integration of UAVs 
into the US National Airspace System Under FAA Interim Operational Approval Guidance 08-01, 
(Feb. 2 2009), at 7, available at http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/ISSC09/UAV_FAA_ 
Integration.pdf (“[T]here is a growing number of accident reports describing mishaps involving 
military UVAs in both Iraq and Afghanistan.”).  The UK has reported losing 33 UAVs in Iraq.  
Craig Hoyle, UK MoD Reveals UAV Losses in Iraq, Afghanistan, FLIGHTGLOBAL, June 6, 2007, 
available at http://www flightglobal.com/articles/2007/06/06/214485/uk-mod-reveals-uav-losses-
in-iraq-afghanistan html. 
18. William T. Thompson et al., U.S. Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Mishaps: 
Assessment of the Role of Human Factors Using Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS), USAF 311TH HUMAN SYSTEMS WING, Mar. 2005, at vi,  http://www. 
dtic mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA435063&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2010).  Mishaps include Class A mishaps—destruction of $1 million in property, loss of a 
Department of Defense aircraft, or a human casualty resulting in loss of life or permanent 
disability; Class B mishaps—$200,000-$1 million in property damage, human casualty leading to 
partial disability or three or more hospitalized personnel; and Class C mishaps—$20,000-
$200,000 in property damage or non-fatal injury leading to loss of time at work. Id. at 6. 
19. Id. at 1; William T. Thompson, U.S. Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Mishaps: 
Assessment of the Role of Human Factors Using Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS), USAF 311TH HUMAN SYSTEMS WING, Mar. 2005, at 1, available at 
http://www.wpafb.af mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090226-154.pdf. 
20. Id. 
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tible than manned craft to ice-related mishaps when operated in cold 
weather.21 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has conducted three 
inquiries concerning domestic UAV crashes.  In April 2006, a Predator 
UAV used by the United States Customs and Border Protection Service 
crashed into the Arizona desert when its operators turned off its engine.22  
When one of the Predator’s two ground control stations locked up during 
flight, its operator switched to the other station but neglected to “align the 
consoles,” inadvertently cutting off the platform’s fuel supply.23  As the 
UAV lost power during flight, it began to “shed electrical equipment to 
conserve electrical power.”24 
Although no one on the ground was injured, “the accident didn’t help 
the [UAV] industry’s reputation.”25  The UAV glided as close to 100 feet 
from two homes before striking the ground; homeowners heard the crash 
and thought a bomb had exploded.26  The NTSB attributed the crash to 
inadequate surveillance of the program, pilot error, and inadequate mainte-
nance procedures performed by the manufacturer.27 
In November 2008, another Predator crashed while performing touch-
and-go landings near Fort Huachuca, Arizona.28  The aircraft slid 1500 feet 
along a runway on its main gear and optical payload ball after its nosewheel 
assembly failed on landing.29  There were no injuries.30 
 
21. Matthew L. Wald, Safety Fears on No-Pilot Airplanes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, at C1, 
C9. 
22. Kim Sengupta, Unmanned Spy Planes to Police Britain, INDEPENDENT (UK), Aug. 6, 
2008, at 4. 
23. David Collogan, UAVs on the Horizon:  The FAA is Facing Mounting Pressure to Allow 
More UAVs in Civil Airspace, BUS. & COM. AVIATION, July 1, 2006, at 92. 
24. NTSB PROBABLE CAUSE REPORT CHI06MA121, available at http://www ntsb.gov/ 
ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20060509X00531&key=1. 
25. Stew Magnuson, FAA Takes Slow Flight Path to Domestic UAV Approval, NATIONAL 
DEFENSE, Apr. 1, 2007, at 12. 
26. UAV Crash Stirs Debate on Drone Safety, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES, Aug. 8, 2006, 
available at http://www.livingroom.org.au/uavblog/archives/uav_crash_stirs_debate_on_drone_ 
safety.php. 
27. NTSB PROBABLE CAUSE REPORT CHI06MA121, available at http://www ntsb.gov/ 
ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20060509X00531&key=1. 
28. NTSB PRELIMINARY REPORT DCA09FA009, available at http://www ntsb.gov/ 
ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20081107X13829&key=1. 
29. Id.  A UAV’s optical payload is typically included in a “ball” or “turret” that hangs 
below the front end of the nose of UAV’s fuselage. See Background—Canadian Forces JUSTAS 
MALE UAV—Hermes 1500, CANADIAN AMERICAN STRATEGIC REVIEW, http://www.casr.ca/bg-
uav-justas-hermes-1500 htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).  While some UAVs are designed to land 
using parachutes or by skidding along the ground, the Predator is equipped with a fixed forward 
landing gear containing a nose-wheel that, if functional, allows the UAV to land like a 
conventional aircraft.  See Tim Wyllie, Parachute Recovery for UAV Systems, available at 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/ViewContentServlet?Filename=Published/EmeraldFull 
TextArticle/Articles/1270730602 html (last visited Mar. 8, 2010); Designation-Systems net, 
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In 2008, an experimental Raytheon Cobra collided with a stadium light 
pole at the United States Air Force Academy while conducting a pre-
programmed landing near Colorado Springs.31  No one was injured.  
Accidents like these have thankfully caused no injuries to date, but wide-
spread use of UAVs in the domestic setting would inevitably produce 
casualties and property loss as a result of crashes or objects falling from 
airborne UAVs. 
B. AIR-TO-AIR COLLISIONS 
A second potential accident associated with UAV use in the domestic 
airspace system would be air-to-air collisions.  At present, UAVs lack the 
“collision avoidance systems that are required on airliners”32 or have, at 
best, “primitive systems for sensing and avoiding other aircraft.”33  
Presumably, such craft would only be employed domestically if technology 
advanced sufficiently to equip UAVs with de-confliction and anti-collision 
capabilities.34  Still, the lack of an on-board pilot who can watch for other 
aircraft exacerbates the risk that a UAV would be involved in a mid-air 
collision.35  Moreover, the small size and radar profile of UAVs create 
significant risk that such craft would damage civilian aircraft, causing both 
property loss and human casualties. 
UAVs operated in Iraq and Afghanistan have nearly collided with 
passenger aircraft on several occasions, including one incident “involving 
an Afghan Airlines jet carrying 100 passengers and a German Army UAV 
over Kabul in August 2004.”36  When the Border Patrol’s Predator UAV 
crashed in 2006, it could have easily hit an aircraft passing under its 
restricted operating area if such aircraft had been there at “just the right 
moment.”37  An Indian UAV crashed with fighter aircraft during a test 
 
General Atomics RQ/MQ-1 Predator, http://www.designation-systems net/dusrm/app2/q-1 html 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2010) (“With its fully retractable tricycle landing gear, the Predator takes off 
and lands like a conventional aeroplane.”). 
30. Id. 
31. NTSB FACTUAL REPORT DEN08FA130, available at http://www ntsb.gov/ntsb/ 
brief.asp?ev_id=20080729X01124&key=1. 
32. Wald, supra note 21, at C9. 
33. Ben Webster, This is Your Pilot. You Don’t Need Me, TIMES (UK), Apr. 2, 2007, at 8. 
34. One domestic UAV producer is seeking to develop collision avoidance systems for its 
UAVs.  Global Aerial Surveillance to Implement Collision Avoidance on UAVs, HELICOPTER 
NEWS, Sept. 6, 2005, available at 2005 WL 14023581. 
35. Wald, supra note 21, at C9. 
36. Webster, supra note 33, at 8. 
37. Collogan, supra note 23, at 92. 
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flight.38  It is hard to imagine widespread integration of UAVs into popu-
lated airspace without some level of air-to-air accidents arising. 
C. COMMUNICATIONS INTERFERENCE 
Although most modern aircraft employ communications technologies, 
UAVs, piloted remotely or by a pre-programmed flight, are particularly 
dependent on quality communications connections.39  Several types of harm 
could result from the communications-dependent nature of such platforms 
if employed for law enforcement use. 
First, UAV communications signals could interfere or disrupt existing 
civilian communications bands.  One can imagine interference with cell 
phones, satellite TV signals, and other civilian communications networks.  
Those who lose service as a result of law enforcement use of UAVs might 
seek compensation for damage done.  Similarly, communications providers 
might claim business losses should UAV signals interfere with their 
protected or licensed channels of communication. 
Second, communication between UAVs and their ground control 
stations could fail, resulting in air-to-air collisions or ground damage.  If 
such interference resulted from the actions of ground controllers, then such 
cases would likely be analyzed under the same principles as air-to-air 
collision and ground damage cases.  However, an additional potential target 
for civil litigation could be a third party whose communications signals 
cause a breakdown in the ground control of UAV communications, 
resulting in a platform veering off course or crashing to the ground. 
D. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY 
UAVs used for law enforcement purposes create potential claims for 
invasion of constitutionally privacy40 and for unlawful search and seizure.  
Overhead imagery and surveillance have long raised privacy concerns un-
der the Fourth Amendment.  Particular types of imaging from UAVs, such 
as thermal imaging, could raise the most significant privacy concerns be-
cause they are capable of penetrating ceilings and capturing images of acti-
 
38. Sanjiv Sharma & D. Chakravarti, UAV Operations:  An Analysis of Incidents and 
Accidents with Human Factors and Crew Resource Management Perspective, 49 IND. J. 
AIRSPACE MED. 29, 33 (2005), available at http://medind nic.in/iab/t05/i1/iabt05i1p29.pdf. 
39. Andre J. Clot, Communications Command & Control:  The Crowded Spectrum, at 1 (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2010), http://ftp rta nato.int/public//PubFulltext/RTO/EN/RTO-EN-009///EN-009-
02B.pdf (“Communications plays a much more important part in the overall operation of a UAV 
than it does for manned aircraft because the men-in-the-loop are on the ground.”). 
40. Sengupta, supra note 22, at 4.  UAV use by law enforcement will inevitably lead to 
concern over privacy implications. Id. 
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vities and heat sources inside a building.41  In addition, unencrypted video 
feeds captured by UAV optical sensors could be intercepted by private 
parties, who might seek to view the downloaded video or other imagery that 
exposes the targets of a UAV’s sensor package to a loss of privacy. 
E. LANDOWNER’S RIGHTS:  NUISANCE AND TRESPASS 
Though perhaps quieter than traditional manned platforms, UAVs 
would make noise.  Such noise pollution—as well as the visual “pollution” 
associated with a flying UAV—could be claimed as damage by property 
owners who had previously enjoyed quiet and unblemished skies.  
Homeowners in the past have successfully brought nuisance actions against 
municipalities and others based on injuries caused by aircraft noise.42  To be 
successful, a plaintiff must show that aircraft noise constitutes “a substan-
tial and unreasonable interference” with the “use and enjoyment” of pro-
perty.43  If civilian UAVs were launched noisily, for instance, from police 
stations or private property, neighbors might bring inverse condemnation 
claims based on nuisance.44  Since UAVs might be operating at lower flight 
levels than traditional manned aircraft, such claims could be more success-
ful.  In many cases, courts have focused on the altitude of aircraft in decid-
ing whether plaintiffs had stated a valid nuisance claim.45  Low level flights 
can also constitute trespass, since they invade a landowner’s exclusive right 
to control the airspace above her property.46  To be actionable in trespass, 
however, aircraft flights would have to interfere with the landowner’s 
actual use of her land.47 
F. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 
UAV use in the domestic airspace system could also produce “spill-
over” effects having potential environmental consequences.48  System 
components such as batteries and circuitry contain hazardous chemicals that 
could leach into ground water supplies in the event of crash or mishap.  
 
41. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001) (explaining that police use of thermal 
imaging device to detect heat within a home is an unlawful search). 
42. See, e.g., Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn’ v. City of Los Angeles, 603 P.2d 
1329, 1330 (Cal. 1979). 
43. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D, Nuisances, §§ 1 et seq.; Jack L. Litwin, Airport Operations or 
Flight of Aircraft as Nuisance, 79 A.L.R.3d 253, § 2 (1977). 
44. See Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn’, 603 P.2d at 1330. 
45. See Litwin, supra note 43, § 10 (collecting cases). 
46. Pueblo of Sandia v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043, 1045 (10th Cir. 1974). 
47. Id. 
48. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing:  Piecemeal Land Controls as Problem of Local 
Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 910-911 (1983) (discussing spillover effects). 
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Moreover, UAVs could be flown into the flight patterns of migratory birds, 
and could cause noise or disruption in other wildlife habitats. 
Environmentalists have long maintained “that aircraft noise adversely 
effects [sic] wildlife, and it has been reported that grizzly bears, bighorn 
sheep, and migratory birds can be harassed and stressed by low-flying 
aircraft.”49  Noise pollution may interfere “with feeding, nesting and resting 
of birds, and can lead to higher mortality rates and abandonment of the 
habitat by both birds and animals.”50  Civil litigation by environmental 
activists would therefore be a distinct possibility. 
G. PIRACY 
A final consideration is the physical security of the UAV.  A UAV 
flown for law enforcement purposes might be intentionally pirated or hi-
jacked by a third party.  Either the UAV itself or its ground operations con-
trol center could be the target of such an attack.51  Were such an attack 
successful, the UAV could cause significant human injury or property loss.  
Inadequate safeguards by law enforcement agencies operating UAVs could 
provide the basis for a potential legal claim where the failure to institute 
safeguards presented a foreseeable risk of a UAV being pirated and used to 
cause injury.52 
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The types of accidents and injuries imagined above could lead to law-
suits against a number of potential defendants:  UAV operators, manufac-
turers, maintenance and safety contractors, contracting parties, and air 
traffic controllers.  Various kinds of civil suits could potentially provide a 
remedy for injured persons and should be considered in managing the risk 
of integrating UAVs into law enforcement roles. 
A. MUNICIPAL AND GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
The starting point of any consideration of law enforcement liability for 
the kinds of UAV accidents and harms imagined above is the diverse and 
complicated set of doctrines providing immunity to municipalities and other 
 
49. Ann E. Lane, Scenic Air Tours Over Our National Parks: Exploitation of Our National 
Resources or Environmental Solution?, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 523, 541 (1996). 
50. Id. at 542 (quoting Don Hopey, Helicopters Wreak Havoc, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 
30, 1995, at A7). 
51. Peterson, supra note 2, at 576. 
52. See, e.g., Finnigan v. Blanco County, 670 S.W.2d 313, 314-15 (Tex. App. 1984).  By 
comparison, where police vehicles have been stolen and personal injuries to third parties have 
resulted, plaintiffs have successfully brought claims to hold police departments liable. Id. 
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governmental actors.  Most of these rules have developed in the context of 
far-more-common motor vehicle accidents involving law enforcement 
personnel.53 
The principle of sovereign immunity was a component of English 
common law, and although it has been repealed or waived by the “federal 
government and many states . . . [,] the doctrine persists today through a 
host of codified or judge-made exceptions that continue to immunize 
certain defined categories of governmental action or inaction from civil 
redress.”54  Governmental actors are also protected by special procedural 
restrictions on civil suits, such as pre-suit notice, exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies, and short time limits for filing actions.55 
The precise contours of such immunity—and its application to UAV 
operation by law enforcement agencies—are complex.  The Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA), for instance, bars lawsuits involving discretionary 
function, actions under statutes later found invalid, and various kinds of 
intentional torts.56  It also bars suits against federal authorities premised on 
strict liability theories.57  In general, many states provide “qualified 
immunity” to law enforcement authorities for claims arising from injuries 
caused by governmental employees in the exercise of their official duties.58  
Law enforcement officers are protected from civil rights claims so long as 
their conduct did not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional 
right,59 and from tort claims, in many cases, so long as the officer acted free 
of willful negligence, malice, or corruption.60  In some cases, injuries 
caused by vehicles operated by law enforcement officers are actionable 
based on simple negligence, while a heightened standard of fault may be 
required at other times.61 
Not all UAV-related lawsuits will be filed against cities and other 
entities enjoying these protections.  It is quite likely that most early UAV 
 
53. See, e.g., Horta v. Sullivan, 638 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1994); Williams v. Crook, 741 So.2d 
1074 (Ala. 1999); Nguyen v. City of Westminster, 103 Cal. App. 4th 1161 (Cal. App. 2002). 
54. Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives:  Should Government Contractors Share 
the Sovereign’s Immunities from Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 195-96 (1997). 
55. See id. at 198 n.65 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994); N.J. STAT ANN. §59:8-8 (West 
1992); and Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938)). 
56. See id. at 196 n.59 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994)). 
57. William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 
1747 n.220 (1992) (citing Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802-03, reh’g denied, 409 U.S. 902 
(1972)). 
58. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense:  Relocating Ineffective 
Assitance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 700 (2007). 
59. See Eugene McQuillin, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 45.20 (3d ed. 2006); 
18 U.S.C. § 1983 (2010). 
60. McQuillin, supra note 59, at § 45.27; 18 U.S.C. § 1983. 
61. McQuillin, supra note 59, at § 45.30. 
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operations by law enforcement agencies will be conducted by private 
contractors—in the employ of the government—who operate and maintain 
the actual systems involved.62  Israeli UAV firms, leaders in export and 
commercial UAV applications, have frequently provided system operators 
along with actual platforms,63 and it would not be surprising if most law 
enforcement users, at least initially, contracted for such services.  Even the 
U.S. military has employed contractors to operate its UAVs.64  Those 
contractors, rather than the government agencies themselves, would likely 
be held legally responsible for most UAV-related mishaps.65  Actions 
against those contractors would not face the precise set of obstacles as 
actions against a government entity itself would face.  The FTCA, for 
instance, expressly excludes federal contractors from its protections.66  
Similarly, more than half of the state statutes providing governmental 
immunity in one form or another exempt independent contractors “from the 
definition of public employees” protected by statute.67 
In addition, products liability claims could be asserted against UAV 
system and component manufacturers and designers.  Although most 
aircraft product liability claims involve suits against manufacturers filed by 
aircraft operators or injured passengers and pilots,68 such claims could be 
brought by those on the ground, or in other aircraft, who claim that faulty 
manufacture led to a UAV crash or collision.  Strict liability for defective 
manufacture and design claims are available in most states for “bystanders” 
injured as a result of such product defects so long as injury to bystanders is 
reasonably foreseeable.69 
 
62. See Michael J. Guidry & Guy J. Willis, Future UAV Pilots:  Are Contractors the 
Solution?, AIR FORCE JOURNAL OF LOGISTICS, Winter 2004, at 4.  The military has relied heavily 
on contractors to operate its UAV systems. Id.  Though law enforcement agencies could seek to 
train their own employees to pilot UAVs, the costs and delays of such training likely make 
contractors a more immediate prospect. Id. 
63. See Hermes 450, ISRAELI-WEAPONS.COM, available at http://www.israeli-weapons.com/ 
weapons/aircraft/uav/hermes_450/Hermes_450 html. 
64. P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law:  Privatized Military Firms and 
International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521, 534 (2004) (discussing civilian operators 
of the Global Hawk and Predator UAV systems). 
65. Rich Smith, Say it Ain’t So, Boeing, THE MOTLEY FOOL, May 29, 2009, available at 
http://www fool.com/investing/general/2009/05/29/say-it-aint-so-boeing.aspx (“Boeing owns the 
UAVs and employs the pilots who ‘fly’ them.  In a very real sense, it is responsible for what these 
UAVs do in the service of its clients.”). 
66. See Sabatino, supra note 54, at 201 n.71 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1994)). 
67. Id. at 201 n.71. 
68. See Sonja A. Soehnel, Products Liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by 
defect in aircraft or its parts, supplies, or equipment, 97 A.L.R.3rd 637 (1980) (collecting cases). 
69. See Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 
WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1236 (1993) (describing bystander actions under various products liability 
theories as “widely recognized”); see also Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 
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B. BASIC LIABILITY RULES 
Two sources of potential legal rules apply to the UAV-caused accident.  
First, existing aviation law governs civil cases concerning manned aircraft.  
Second, some case law exists on torts involving remote-controlled-aircraft, 
typically operated by hobbyists for recreational purposes.70  In addition, 
those accidents and harms concerning communication interference would 
be governed by established principles of communications law. 
In general, actions involving manned aircraft accidents are pursued 
under one of the two dominant tort doctrines: negligence or strict liability.  
Negligence claims involving aircraft disasters are asserted against opera-
tors, including air carriers, pilots, and manufacturers, and occasionally 
against air traffic controllers.71  Strict liability claims can be asserted in 
situations involving ground damage and in connection with product liability 
actions against “aircraft manufacturers and manufacturers or suppliers of 
component parts.”72 
1. Ground Damage 
Ground damage caused by aircraft can be the basis for an action in 
either negligence or strict liability.  In the early part of the twentieth 
century, the legal community viewed aviation as an “ultrahazardous 
activity” and actionable by way of strict liability, that is, without proof of a 
deviation from the standard of care.73  Even as safety improved, the authors 
of the Restatement of Torts, in 1965, continued to favor strict liability for 
ground damage claims, perhaps because of the non-reciprocal74 nature of 
the risk imposed on persons, land, and property on the ground by an 
 
(Cal. 1969) (arguing that bystanders should have stronger claims even in the absence of privity 
because they lack the opportunity to inspect a product and discover dangerous defects). 
70. FAA Order 1110.150, Apr. 10, 2008, available at http://rgl.faa.gov/regulatory_and_ 
guidance_library/rgOrders.nsf/0/8616600949dcc4b78625742c004c52b0/$FILE/1110.150.pdf.  
The FAA has clarified that its 1981 rules regulating model aircraft do not govern UAV operation:  
“The law enforcement and aerial photography industries, plus others conducting remote sensing 
activities, have mistakenly interpreted FAA advisory circular (AC) 91-57, Model Aircraft 
Operating Standards, for permission to operate small UAVs for research or compensation or hire 
purposes.” Id. 
71. Michael C. Mineiro, Assessing the Risks: Tort Liability and Risk Management in the 
Event of a Commercial Human Space Flight Vehicle Accident, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 371, 376 
(2009). 
72. Id. 
73. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 cmt. b (“[A]viation in its 
present state of development is ultrahazardous.”) (1938). 
74. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 
(1972). 
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overflying aircraft.75  Section 520A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
imposed strict liability on operators and owners whenever “physical harm 
to land or to persons or chattels on the ground is caused by the ascent, 
descent, or flight of aircraft, or by the dropping or falling of an object from 
the aircraft.”76  Several states, including Delaware, Hawaii, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, South Carolina, and Vermont, have adopted the strict liability 
doctrine for ground damage by statute.77  Some courts, however, have 
rejected the strict liability approach to ground damage, instead allowing 
suits only upon a showing of aircraft operator negligence.78  And it may be 
that the general rule has shifted in favor of the negligence approach.79  The 
Proposed Third Restatement of Torts recognizes this issue as a difficult one, 
and leaves open the question of whether ground damage caused by aircraft 
should be subject to strict liability or negligence.80 
The first question concerning the scope of liability for UAV operators 
in ground damage cases would be whether strict liability applied or whether 
the injured person would have to show the traditional elements of 
negligence.  In a jurisdiction that follows the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, this question would likely depend on whether a UAV is considered 
an “aircraft.” 
Interestingly, the Restatement does not define “aircraft.”  Is the UAV 
considered to be an aircraft?  The typical moniker—UAV—uses the term 
vehicle, but some have argued that system is a more appropriate description, 
given that the actual airframe is but a small part of the overall machinery 
required to operate a UAV.81  If one chose to conceptualize surveillance 
drones as “unmanned aerial systems” (UASs), the Restatement language 
imposing strict liability might not apply because a “system” does not fit 
neatly into ordinary definitions of the term “aircraft.” 
The FAA has used the term “Unmanned Aircraft (UA),” since its 
regulatory authority is limited to aircraft and does not include “vehicles.”82  
 
75. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A, § 520A cmt. c 
(1977). 
76. Id. at § 520A. 
77. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 cmt. k (special note 
on eviction ground damage) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
78. The Restatement lists California, Nebraska, and Arkansas as rejecting the proposed rule 
of strict liability.  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Reporter’s 
Note (1977).  Washington also rejects the strict liability approach in favor of negligence.  Crosby 
v. Cox Aircraft Co., 746 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Wash. 1987). 
79. Jones, supra note 57, at 1747. 
80. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 cmt. j (2005). 
81. Peterson, supra note 2, at 528. 
82. Fed. Aviation Admin., Memorandum, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations in the 
U.S. National Air Space System—Interim Operational Guidance, AFS-400 UAS Policy 05-01 
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To the FAA, an unmanned aircraft is “a device that is used or intended to be 
used for flight in the air that has no onboard pilot.  This includes all classes 
of airplanes, helicopters, airships, and translational lift aircraft that have no 
onboard pilot.  A UA is an aircraft as defined in 14 CFR 1.1.”83  Adopting 
the FAA’s definition, a court following the Restatement or parallel state 
statutory approach might impose strict liability in the event of ground 
damage caused by UAV mishaps because the FAA has incorporated the 
term “aircraft”—the same term used in the Restatement—in its description 
of UAVs. 
Even where strict liability is not available, or where courts conclude 
that UAVs are not “aircraft” subject to section 520A, it is possible that 
operation of UAVs would nevertheless be considered an abnormally 
dangerous activity subject to strict liability.  The following subsection con-
cerning air-to-air collisions analyzes this issue. 
Under the FAA’s developing guidance, many larger UAVs would 
likely be considered “aircraft” but small or micro-UAVs might not be so 
classified because of the significant size difference between typical micro-
UAVs and the unmanned “airplanes, helicopters, [and] airships” referred to 
in the FAA’s definition.84  Actions involving micro-UAVs would likely be 
governed by case law on injuries caused by radio-controlled aircraft.  
Persons injured when radio-controlled model aircraft crashed into the 
ground have brought suit under negligence principles.85 
Injuries caused by UAVs crashing to the ground might also be pursued 
under products liability theories, including negligence, “special” or strict 
liability,86 and various warranty claims.  Generally speaking, plaintiffs 
could point either to defects in the design of a product that rendered it 
unreasonably dangerous, or to defects in the manufacture of the UAV.  To 
some extent, the “government contractor” doctrine could shield UAV 
manufacturers from liability for design defects if they produced their 
products according to government specifications,87 although that defense 
would be unavailable in manufacturing defect claims and where the private 
 
(Sept. 16, 2005), available at http:// www.uavm.com/images/AFS-400_05-01_faa_uas_policy.pdf 
[hereinafter AFS-400 UAS Policy]. 
83. Id.  An “aircraft” is defined as a “device that is used or intended to be used for flight in 
the air.” 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2009). 
84. Peterson, supra note 2, at 529. 
85. See, e.g., Rowe v. Striker, No. 07CA009296, 2008 WL 4901702 (Ohio Ct. App.); Klein 
v. Acad. of Model Aeronautics, 667 N.Y.S.2d 311, 311 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
86. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977). 
87. J. SCOTT HAMILTON, PRACTICAL AVIATION LAW 70 (2d ed. 1996). 
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party designed the UAV outside the scope of the government contracting 
process.88 
Actions involving ground damage might also focus on the “airworthi-
ness” certificate granted by the FAA to aircraft.  The FAA has recently 
promulgated standards for assessing the airworthiness of a UAV.89  
Negligence on the part of federal authorities at any stage in the certification 
process could trigger liability if it contributes to a UAV crash.90 
2. Air-to-Air Collisions 
Aircraft operators owe a duty of ordinary care to the owners, operators, 
and passengers on other aircraft.91  Negligence provides the cause of action 
for careless maintenance and operation of aircraft leading to in-flight 
collisions.92  In addition, violations of FAA operating rules can help prove 
the necessary breach of the standard of care. 
UAV operators could face a heightened level of liability for air-to-air 
collisions if courts classify the operation of UAVs as an “abnormally 
dangerous activity.”  Strict liability follows from the conclusion that an 
activity is “not one of common usage” and is one that “creates a foreseeable 
and highly significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is 
exercised by all actors.”93  UAVs, in their early integration into law 
enforcement settings, would likely be considered highly unusual.  The 
Restatement’s “common usage” test imposes strict liability based on 
analysis of “the number of people who take part in” a particular activity.94  
The more flexible approach endorsed by the Third Restatement of Torts 
considers activities in common usage “if . . . widely carried on by many 
persons, or if it is a widespread and accepted practice, or if ‘nearly 
everyone does it or expect to have it done for him.’”95 
Traditional aviation is now considered a matter of common usage,96 
but the operation of UAVs is something new.  Even if law enforcement 
 
88. Charles E. Cantu & Randy W. Young, The Government Contractor Defense: Breaking 
Down the Boyle Barrier, 62 ALBANY L. REV. 403, 425 (1998). 
89. FAA Order 8130.34, March 27, 2008, available at http://www faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/ 
design_approvals/uas/reg (follow order 8130.34 hyperlink). 
90. HAMILTON, supra note 87, at 129. 
91. See Mineiro, supra note 71, at 387. 
92. Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1999). 
93. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 (2005). 
94. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanimd Co., 662 F.Supp. 635, 643 (N.D. Ill. 
1987) (citing New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 687 P.2d 212, 216 
(Wash. 1984)), rev’d, 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990). 
95. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 cmt. J (2005) 
(quoting Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255, 1263 (Or. 1982)). 
96. Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co. of Washington, 746 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Wash. 1987). 
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agencies come to employ UAVs in a wide variety of settings, it is likely 
that only a few contracting companies will actually engage in the operation 
of UAV platforms because of the high costs of entry to the UAV field and 
the complexities of the systems involved.  Given the existing uncertainty 
over the scope of the “common usage” analysis,97 it is somewhat difficult to 
predict what legal standard would apply to UAV cases in the courts. 
However, in order to impose strict liability on a UAV operator under 
the “abnormally dangerous activities” doctrine, a court would also need to 
determine whether operation of a UAV can be made safe by the exercise of 
reasonable care.  At first blush, some observers might conclude that pilot-
less air systems are by definition inherently risky, since there is no pilot in a 
cockpit capable of interceding to avert disaster.  Moreover, one of the 
selling points of UAVs is that they are more “expendable” than manned 
aircraft; this notion evinces a vision of UAVs as more likely to crash than 
safer manned aircraft equipped with redundant safety systems that are 
subject to rigorous maintenance requirements.  On the other hand, it is 
arguable that the exercise of care could greatly minimize the risk of 
personal injury in connection with UAV operations. 
Even if ordinary negligence principles apply, courts confronting UAV-
related air collision cases would have to instruct juries on what is 
“reasonable” in regards to the operation of a UAV.  Some of the legal rules 
that apply in cases involving piloted aircraft might not be applicable in 
UAV accidents. 
For instance, negligence claims involving piloted aircraft often seek to 
establish a breach of the duty of due care by reference to a pilot’s responsi-
bility to “see and avoid” other traffic.98  It is a fundamental maxim of 
aviation negligence law, “referred to over and over in the reported cases 
involving air carrier crashes and other accidents,” that “the pilot in com-
mand of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as 
to, the operation of the aircraft.”99  To the extent that a UAV has a pilot, of 
course, she may be located far from the actual platform. 
Pilots of manned aircraft are expected to scan an area sixty degrees to 
the right and left of center and ten degrees up and down from the flight 
path.100  Where evidence suggests that a pilot could have seen another air-
 
97. Gerald W. Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities:  The Negligence 
Barrier, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 662 (1999) (“Liability does not rise or fall on common usage 
or locational suitability; rather the cases are ‘all over the map’ with regard to these factors.”). 
98. Rodriguez v. U.S., 823 F.2d 735, 742 (3rd Cir. 1987). 
99. See STUART M. SPEISER & CHARLES F. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW § 8:3 at 473 
(1978). 
100. Rodriguez, 823 F.2d at 742. 
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craft within those angles, res ipsa loquitor might authorize the conclusion 
that a breach occurred.101  Since UAV optical sensors have limited fields of 
view,102 courts would have to confront what kinds of failures in “seeing” 
would be deemed unreasonable for UAV operators.  A new “duty of vigi-
lance”103 would need to be crafted to determine the potential liability of the 
UAV operator. 
Even under a negligence standard, many juries might be suspicious of 
UAV operations and unlikely to blame the pilots of other craft involved in 
midair collisions with UAVs.  According to one Royal Air Force officer, 
“People will ask why there wasn’t someone in the cockpit, even it turns out 
to be the fault of the pilot in the other aircraft.”104  Air to air collisions 
could also lead to lawsuits against either government-employed or private 
air traffic controllers.  Under the FTCA, the negligence of an air traffic 
controller that contributes to an accident would remain actionable because 
the general rule is that courts “may entertain claims under the FTCA against 
government air traffic controllers for negligence in the performance of their 
duties.”105 
3. Communications Interference 
UAVs depend upon signals—operating at various points in the electro-
magnetic spectrum—for both operational control and mission effectiveness.  
To date, UAV users have been forced to operate on unlicensed or unregu-
lated frequencies to transmit information between the UAV and its ground 
control,106 or have operated on experimental frequencies in the aviation 
spectrum as authorized by the FCC.107  Unregulated signals may interfere 
with civilians’ use of various wireless and telecommunications devices.108  
 
101. O’Connor v. United States, 251 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1958); Irwin v. Pacific 
Southwest Airlines, 133 Cal. App. 3d 709, 716 (1982). 
102. Israel and Russia in UAV Deal, DEFENSE INDUSTRY DAILY, June 23, 2009, available at 
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Israel-and-Russia-in-UAV-Deal-05459/ (“UAVs have a 
much smaller field of view than manned aircraft . . . .”). 
103. Rodriguez, 823 F.2d at 742. 
104. Ben Webster, This is Your Pilot. You Don’t Need Me, TIMES (UK), April 2, 2007, at 8 
(quoting Squadron Leader Rich Wells). 
105. See HAMILTON, supra note 87, at 126; R. Daniel Truitt, Hints of an Uneven Playing 
Field in Aviation Torts: Is there Proof?, 61 J. AIR L. & COMM. 577, 582 (1996) (citing Eastern 
Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), rev’d 350 U.S. 907 (1956) (per curium)). 
106. UAV Impacts on NAS Discussed in Paris, MITRE CAASD, Sept. 22, 2005, available at 
http://www mitrecaasd.org/comm/news_details.cfm?item_id=440. 
107. See, e.g., FCC Pub. Not. Rept. No. 418, EXPERIMENTAL ACTIONS, 2009 WL 196282 
(allocation of frequencies for Sacramento UAV testing). 
108. See Larry Greenemeier, Receive Between the Lines:  FCC Mulls Signal “White Space” 
as Part of National Broadband Plan, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Jan. 18, 2010, available at 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=fcc-white-space-sensing (last visited Mar. 8, 
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Common law nuisance claims, however, would be prohibited by the appli-
cation of federal preemption doctrine.109 
Presumably, integration into the national airspace system would 
involve allocation of specific frequencies to UAV operators, but potential 
for signal interference might still remain.110  UAV integration into the 
national airspace system would have a significant “impact on overall avia-
tion spectrum requirements.”111  UAV signals might interfere with existing 
uses of aviation band frequencies.  Private citizens and businesses might 
seek administrative remedies, petitioning the FCC to revoke the spectrum 
allotment of a UAV operator.  Should ground-control stations indeed cause 
“blanketing” interference, the FCC Enforcement Bureau’s Spectrum 
Enforcement Division would require that the operator address such con-
cerns at no cost to the complainant within one year of complaint.112 
Given that UAV control will likely take place over assigned frequen-
cies in the aviation band (with care taken by the FCC to avoid potential 
interference), it is likely that more serious sources of signal interference 
would arise if  commercial radio and telecommunications firms deployed 
UAVs for communications relay purposes.  A UAV control signal might 
not disrupt civilian communications networks, but the signal broadcast from 
a UAV—playing the role traditionally occupied by a cellular relay tower—
certainly could.113 
4. Constitutional Rights & Privacy 
The United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment protects citizens 
against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”114  In order to offend that 
right, law enforcement must conduct a “search”—a legal concept that has 
 
2010) (“[C]ritics fear that a flood of unregulated wireless devices will interfere with one another 
or with licensed users . . . .”). 
109. Broyde v. Gotham Tower, Inc., 13 F.3d 994 (6th Cir. 1994). 
110. See, e.g., In re Aviation Data Systems (AUST) Pty. Ltd., 47 COMMUNICATIONS REG. 
1411, at *2 (2009) (stating that aircraft data-link services can raise communications interference 
concerns). 
111. See Pub. Notice, 22 F.C.C.R. 127, 169 (Jan. 9, 2007). 
112. MASS MEDIA BUREAU, FED, COMMC’N., THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING 10 (1999), 
1999 WL 391297. 
113. Cell phone tower signals have the potential to cause radio frequency interference with 
other wireless devices operating at similar frequencies along the communications spectrum.  See 
Mohan R. Akella et al., Cellular network configuration with co-channel and adjacent channel 
interference constraints, 35 COMPUTERS & OPERATIONS RESEARCH 3738, 3739 (2008) 
(“Interference has been recognized as a major bottleneck in increasing capacity . . . .”).  UAVs 
used as cellular relays could interfere with other cellular signals, causing, for instance, more 
frequent dropped calls. Id.  Because of their mobility, UAVs used as relays could raise greater 
risks of co-channel and adjacent channel interference. Id. 
114. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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evolved over time and escaped precise definition.115  In general, when 
government actors encroach on a person, effect, or object, as to which a 
citizen has a reasonable expectation of privacy, a search has occurred.116 
Random aerial searches have been held to constitute invasions of 
protected privacy rights.117  However, under existing law, where an ordi-
nary passerby on the “highway of the sky” could observe what officers 
observe, no privacy rights are implicated.118  Society is not willing to pro-
tect the privacy of “open fields” or activities “in plain view.”119  Where 
police used a helicopter and high-powered binoculars to observe marijuana 
plants through slats in a person’s greenhouse, no constitutional violation 
was found.120  The government’s use of routine technology does not 
infringe on the Constitutional right to privacy.121  Homeowners have no 
expectation to privacy with respect to that which can be viewed “from 
above during legal passage by aircraft.”122  Where a UAV captures images 
that could have been obtained from civilian aircraft travelling in a legally 
authorized manner, privacy claims are limited.  Consumers lack a reason-
able expectation of privacy with respect to areas already exposed to civilian 
overflights. 
Advanced imaging capabilities, such as thermal sensing and infrared 
imaging, would raise particular privacy concerns.  In Kyllo v. United 
States,123 the Supreme Court held that the warrantless use of thermal-
imaging violated a person’s Fourth Amendment rights because such techno-
logy was not in widespread use.124  Although the court might revisit that 
holding were advanced imaging technology to enter more widespread use, 
at present, Kyllo limits law enforcement’s ability to exploit thermal and 
infrared imaging using UAVs. 
The rationale behind Kyllo might lead some courts to conclude that any 
UAV-related search offends the Fourth Amendment.  Kyllo linked Fourth 
Amendment protections to the status of the technology used for surveil-
 
115. Gregory S. Fisher, Cracking Down on Soccer Moms and Other Urban Legends on the 
Frontier of the Fourth Amendment:  is it Finally Time to Re-define Searches and Seizures?, 38 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 137, 141-42 (2002). 
116. Id. at 142. 
117. People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 837 (Cal. App. 1984). 
118. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986). 
119. See id.; United States v. DeBacker, 493 F.Supp. 1078, 1080-81 (W.D. Mich. 1980). 
120. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989). 
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lance, finding that the use of surveillance devices “not in general public 
use” was a presumptive violation of the Constitution.125  Arguably, in the 
early years of UAV use by law enforcement, any UAV surveillance would 
meet this test.  Even as law enforcement use becomes more prevalent, 
UAVs are unlikely to become widely available to the public for both 
economic and safety reasons.  The Court’s decision in Kyllo has left open 
how to decide when a technology is sufficiently “in the public use” or 
overlaps with related technologies in general use so as to render a search 
using that technology permissible.126 
Claims of Fourth Amendment violations would be most likely to arise 
in defense to criminal charges against suspects using evidence gathered 
from aerial UAV surveillance.  However, civil rights lawsuits could also be 
filed even where no charges are brought.127  A section 1983 claim can be 
stated where the (1) conduct complained of was committed by a person 
acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of 
a federal constitutional or statutory right.128  Plaintiffs would still need to 
prove “actual injury” in order to recover damages, but such injury could 
potentially be shown, particularly if the imagery obtained from UAV flights 
is made public—either intentionally, inadvertently, or as a result of third 
party interception of UAV signals.129  Injunctive relief would also be 
available to civil plaintiffs who might seek to stop UAV overflights found 
to violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Common law actions for intrusion on seclusion might also be 
available,130 but again, a victim would need to show damages.131  Even in 
the absence of physical trespass, aerial surveillance could constitute tortious 
conduct in the majority of states.132  The exact contours of this tort action 
have not been well developed, and clear outcomes of such cases are hard to 
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predict, in part because of uncertainty concerning when intrusion is so 
“highly offensive to a reasonable person”  as to be actionable.133 
One question that such claims would confront is why UAV aerial sur-
veillance differed from generally permissible aerial surveillance conducted 
by helicopters, airplanes, or commercial satellites.  Several lines of argu-
ment would be available to plaintiffs seeking to advance this point.  Many 
UAVs, for instance, are capable of flying for long periods of time, staying 
in the “air for 30 hours at a time with pilots switching off very few 
hours.”134 
Helicopter surveillance of open fields from an altitude of just 300 feet 
has been held permissible,135 while helicopter surveillance from 20-25 feet 
above a person’s property has been identified as a likely illegal invasion of 
privacy.136  Courts would likely be called on to evaluate the altitudes at 
which UAVs operate, the frequency and duration of aerial surveillance, and 
the imaging capabilities of unmanned platforms in determining the 
reasonableness (and thus legality) of any search.137  In many of the 
permissible instances of aerial surveillance, investigators used the naked 
eye,138 standard and widely available commercial cameras, and the like, to 
view their targets.139  By contrast, more advanced imaging techniques that 
reveal “intimate details” of a property owner’s activity have been held 
unconstitutional.140  Analysis of the reasonableness of UAV aerial surveil-
lance will depend on how similar the data obtained by UAV operation is to 
data already available to the public.141  If UAV imagery proves far more 
revealing than existing commercially-produced data, then it is more 
likely that UAV-obtained imagery could be the basis for a claim of 
illegal search. 
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5. Landowner’s Rights:  Nuisance & Trespass 
Property owners may pursue claims for both nuisance and trespass 
against aircraft operators.  A trespass to land claim may only be asserted 
when an aircraft “enters into the immediate reaches of the air space next to 
the land” and “interferes substantially with . . . use and enjoyment” of the 
property by the landowner.142  In general, the navigable airways regulated 
by the FAA are considered a “public highway” outside of the landowner’s 
property, and no trespass claims could be brought.143  Five hundred feet 
above ground is outside of a landowner’s territorial claim, while fifty feet 
and perhaps even 150 feet above ground could constitute unpermitted 
interference.144 
Law enforcement may operate UAVs below the traditional flight paths 
of civil aviation, raising potential trespass claims.  Low flying UAVs that 
cause noise, light, air pollution, or vibration might lead to valid nuisance 
claims by homeowners.145 
6. Environmental Concerns 
Various legal avenues exist by which local governments and preserva-
tion groups could bring civil actions seeking injunctions to stop law 
enforcement agencies from operating UAVs in ways that raise environ-
mental concerns.  Where federal agencies utilize UAVs in law enforcement 
roles, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires agencies to 
consider the environmental consequences of their actions.146  Private 
citizens may seek to compel a federal agency to comply with NEPA by 
seeking judicial review of agency decisions under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.147 
Other environmental statutes also provide citizen-suit remedies.  
Where noise pollution from UAVs threatens human health, citizen actions 
would also be permitted under the Noise Control Act.148  Where UAV use 
threatens wildlife, citizen-suits might be permitted under the Endangered 
Species Act.149 
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IV. ADDITIONAL LEGAL CONCERNS 
A. CONFLICTS OF LAWS 
One of the thornier aspects of aviation litigation has long been the 
determination of what law governs a particular aviation accident.150  
“Because of the speed, mobility and range of modern aircraft—especially 
modern high-speed, long-distance jets—and the resulting multistate or 
multi-country contracts with aircraft supply, operations, and accident . . . [,] 
aviation tort cases and litigation have furnished an important labora-
tory . . . and vexing problems as to choice-of-law.”151 
Courts have traditionally taken two approaches to choice of law issues 
in aviation liability claims.  One approach is to apply the law of the place 
where the last event necessary to create liability occurred.152  Alternatively, 
courts have focused on the “most significant relationship” test under the 
theory that the actual site of the crash may be “purely fortuitous.”153  Under 
this modern approach, a court “applies the law of the forum with the most 
significant contacts to the accident.”154  This will involve a consideration of 
“(1) crash site location; (2) residence of all defendants; (3) residence of the 
plaintiff; (4) nature and purpose of the flight; (5) where the negligence 
occurred; (6) where the product was designed and manufactured and (7) 
any other significant factors.”155 
UAVs introduce a new dynamic to choice of law issues in that aircraft 
are controlled not from the cockpit of the platform, but from a remote 
ground station.  In a traditional aircraft case, the location of launch or of 
crash would likely determine the law applied.156  But in UAV liability 
cases, it might be that the site of operation could be introduced as a third 
potential relational jurisdiction. 
B. INSURANCE LAW 
Private contractors operating UAVs in the service of law enforcement 
authorities will no doubt seek to protect themselves from property damage 
and potential liability by purchasing insurance; in many countries, such 
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insurance is required by law.157  UAV insurance will likely prove much 
more expensive than policies offered to operators of other kinds of airborne 
sensors, such as aerostats.158  The cost of insurance for some UAVs 
operated for scientific purposes has been nearly 85% of the cost of 
operation per flight hour.159  One commercial UAV imagery company, for 
example, carries $2 million in liability insurance and invites customers to 
request categorization as “Additional Insured” under its policy.160  The 
aviation insurance industry will no doubt craft products to satisfy such 
customer demand, but existing insurance models will have to adjust to 
accommodate UAV operation.  Some of the companies underwriting avia-
tion insurance “may not know about the growing need for UAV insurance,” 
and view UAV policies as a “niche market.”161 
Traditionally, aircraft are insured against property loss through “hull 
insurance” policies.  Policies may specify who is authorized to pilot such 
aircraft and exclude certain risks and losses.162  In particular, while 
traditional aircraft insurance policies focus on the platform itself, UAV 
insurance will have to cover associated system components such as ground 
control stations.  The cost of such hull insurance policies has been 
estimated to reach 2% of UAV replacement value, plus .5% of ground 
station replacement value and $30,000 per UAV mission.163 
Similarly, aircraft liability insurance policies would need to be adjusted 
to take into account the wide range of potential applications for law 
enforcement UAVs.  While traditional liability policies have covered such 
categories of use as “limited commercial,” “business or pleasure,” or 
“industrial aid,”164 UAV policies would need to be written in either an 
open-ended fashion or to explicitly account for potentially hazardous law 
enforcement mission areas. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
UAVs will provide law enforcement with significant surveillance 
capabilities when the regulatory hurdles to the integration of such platforms 
into the national airspace system have been cleared.  Although the fiscal 
and operational benefits of UAV integration seem clear, the road ahead is 
not free of risk and concerns.  UAV accidents will prove a lucrative area for 
potential aviation litigation, and courts will be compelled to wrestle with a 
number of thorny issues in addressing the place of UAVs within established 
doctrines of aviation civil liability. 
 
